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Abstract 
 
 The study assesses whether selected exogenous variables: tax rate, size, asset 
tangibility, volatility and profitability, affect capital structure in a significant manner in 
the sugar industry. It suggests that decision on capital structuring is found to be weakly 
affected by the variables chosen in our study. This is also consistent with the results of 
Booth et al (2001) where modern financial theory is found to be weakly portable across a 
group of developed and developing countries. It is recommended that more empirical 
work is done in order to understand the impact of capital structure choices. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Capital structure refers to the way a corporation finances itself through some 
combination of equity sales, equity options, bonds, and loans. Optimal capital structure 
refers to the particular combination that minimizes the cost of capital while maximizing 
the stock price. Is there an optimal capital structure, one that allows a corporation to get 
the most bang for its bucks? If so, what is that structure and on what factors does it 
depend? We derive our knowledge of capital structures from developed economies that 
have institutional similarities. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the capital structure 
choices made by various companies. 
  
 The paper is organized as follows Section II reviews the literature on 
determinants of capital structure; section III discusses the methodology and the data. 
Section IV presents the results and conclusions are provided in section V. 
 
II. An elective review of the literature 
 Modigliani & Miller (1958) forms the basis for modern thinking on capital 
structure. The basic theorem states that, in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and 
asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by 
how that firm is financed. It does not matter if the firm’s capital is raised by issuing stock 
or selling debt. It does not matter what the firm’s dividend policy is.  
 
 
 Several studies on determination of capital structure focus on those forces that 
move firms away from their target ratios and give the impression that a firm’s history is a 
more important determinant of capital structure than are firm characteristics that proxy 
for the costs and benefits of debt versus equity financing. 
 
 Capital structure theory suggests that firms determine what is often referred to as 
a target debt-equity ratio, which is based on various tradeoffs between the costs and 
benefits of debt versus equity. In a recent survey of CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) 
report that 37% of their respondents have a flexible capital structure target, 34% have a 
somewhat tight target or range and 10% have a strict target. Consistent with the idea that 
targets may be flexible, capital structure theory provides arguments based on information 
asymmetries, market inefficiencies, and transaction costs that explain why firms’ cash 
flows, investment expenditures and stock price histories can lead them to deviate from 
the targets suggested by the traditional tradeoff theories. 
 
 Other factors suggested by authors as determinants of capital structure are past 
profitability, financial deficits, past stock returns and market timing. 
 
 Past profitability: Titman and Wessels (1988) and others find that firms with 
higher past profits tend to have lower debt ratios. This evidence, which has been 
attributed to the Donaldson (1961) and Myers (1984) studies of pecking order of 
financing preferences, is consistent with tax, transaction costs, and adverse selection 
arguments that imply that internally generated equity is less costly than equity capital that 
is raised externally. 
 
 Financial deficits: Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find that firms with higher 
financial deficits, i.e., firms that raise more external capital, tend to increase their 
leverage. This evidence is consistent with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection 
model. 
 
 Market timing: Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine the tendency of managers to 
“time the equity markets” by interacting the market-to-book ratio with the amount of 
capital that a firm raises (i.e., its financial deficit). Their evidence suggests that firms tend 
to reduce their leverage ratios when they raise substantial amounts of capital when the 
equity market is perceived to be more favorable, (i.e., when market-to-book ratios are 
higher). There seems to be a consensus in the literature that suggests that these variables 
affect capital structures, at least temporarily. 
 
 To examine changes in capital structure over somewhat longer time periods (5 
and 10 year changes) Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) look 
at changes in leverage over one year. We will include one year changes in capital 
structuring. 
 
 A study by Miao (2005) provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital 
structure and industry dynamics. In the model, firms make financing, investment, entry, 
and exit decisions subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice 
reflects the tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and associated bankruptcy and 
agency costs. The interaction between financing and production decisions influences the 
stationary distribution of firms and their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates 
that the “equilibrium” output price has an important feedback effect. This effect has a 
number of testable implications. For example it implies that high growth industries have 
relatively lower leverage and turnover rates. 
 
 Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that managerial overconfidence can account 
for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to 
their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest 
when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require 
external financing. They test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal 
portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs in (given year). They 
classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure 
to company-specific risk. Their finding was that investment of overconfident CEOs is 
significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity-dependent firms. 
 
 Several authors have studied the conditions under which the different policies for 
CEO compensation are preferred by shareholders. Fang (2005) discusses the relation 
between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting 
services. After controlling for endogeneity in issuer–underwriter matching, the author 
found that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees, but issuers’ net 
proceeds are higher. These relations are pronounced in the junk-bond category, in which 
reputable banks’ underwriting criteria are most stringent. These findings suggest that 
banks’ underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of 
issue quality. They also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby 
provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation. This can enhance 
the growth rate of capitalization.  
 
 In a related work, Hodder and Senbet (1990) concluded that differences in 
international tax rate alone are incapable of dictating a particular capital structure for an 
individual firm. On the empirical side, gearing ratios cannot be expected to be the same 
in different tax jurisdictions. Textbooks see for example Gitman (2000:505) and Brealy 
and Myers (1991), contain figures that show relatively higher level of debt for firms that 
are based in Europe and Asia. Rajan and Zingales (1995) reported that aggregate level 
permanent debt capital ratio in the G7 countries had been fairly similar over the 1984-
1991 period. Ceteris paribus the Rajan and Zimgales (op cit) report, economists attribute 
the difference to extent of financial intermediation, differences in institutional structures 
governing bankruptcy policy, debt renegotiation and differences in the market for 
corporate control. The literature on international accounting adds accounting method 
differences as an additional explanation.  
 
 We follow Booth et al (2001) who assessed whether capital strucutre theory is 
portable across countries with different institutional structures. They analyse capital 
structure choices of firms in ten countries, and provide evidence that these decisions are 
affected by the same variables in both developing and developed countries. However the 
authors found that there are persistent differences across countries indicating that country 
specific factors are at work. Also Booth’s findings suggest that although some of the 
insights from modern finance theory are portable across countries, others are not. 
 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.1. Data  
 There are presently 71-sugar mills operating in Pakistan. 38 are located in Punjab, 
28 in Sindh and 5 in NWFP. Details are given in Table 1. 33 sugar manufacturing 
corporations are listed on Karachi stock exchange. Nine of these sugar companies are 
theoritically bankrupt as they  have negative equity. They are, therefore, not included in 
the main body of this analysis. However they have been separately analyzed in Appendix 
–1. 
 
Table 1: 
Sugar mills listed on KSE 2007 
S.No Year of listing Province  r mills  
1 1992 Sindh      Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Limited  
2 1979 Sindh Al - Noor Sugar Mills Limited  
3 1987 Sindh Dewan Sugar Mills Limited  
4 1984 Sindh Faran Sugar Mills Limited  
5 1963 Sindh Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. **  
6 1982 Sindh Habib Arkady Limited **  
7 1968 Sindh Mehran Sugar Mills Limited  
8 1964 Sindh Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited  
9 1989 Sindh Sanghar Sugar Mills Limited  
10 1984 Sindh Shahmurad Sugar Mills Limited  
11 1987 Sindh Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Limi  
12 1967 Punjab Adam Sugar  
13 1965 Punjab Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill  
14 1994 Punjab Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Limit  
15 1967 Punjab Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller  
16 1973 Punjab Kohinoor Sugar Mills Limited  
17 1966 Punjab Noon Sugar Mills Limited  
18 1967 Punjab Shahtaj Sugar Mills Limited  
19 1970 Punjab Shakerganj Sugar Mills Limited  
20 1992 Punjab Tandianwala Sugar Mills Limite  
21 1967 Punjab Thal Industrial Corporation Li  
22 1991 N.W.F.P Chashma Sugar Mills Limited  
23 1961 N.W.F.P Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill  
24 1955 N.W.F.P Premier Sugar  
25 *1990 Sindh Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited  
26 *1991 Sindh Ansari Sugar Mills Limited  
27 *1965 Sindh Bawany Sugar Mills Limited  
28 *1993 Sindh Khairpur Sugar  
29 *1994 Sindh Mirza Sugar Mills Limited  
30 *1987 Sindh Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited  
31 *1990 Sindh Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited  
32 *1984 Punjab Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited  
33 *1971 Punjab United Sugar Mills Limited 
 
 The data for the study has been taken from the annual reports of sugar mills for 
the period 2000-2005. The data set is being extended to cover the period 1981-2005 to 
enable us to incorporate macro variables as explanatory factors. Regression analysis has 
been performed on the data converted in log form. 
 
 The list of abbreviations used in results is provided below. 
TR = Tax rate 
ROA = Return on Assets 
S = Size of the firm 
AT = Asset tangibility 
TDR = Total Debt Ratio 
MBR = Market-to-book ratio 
LBDR = Long-term book-debt ratio 
LMDR = Long-term market-debt ratio 
 
III.2. Methodology 
 Following Booth et al (2001) we estimate the following models under random and 
fixed effect conditions using pooled regression techniques. These single equation models 
were estimated to determine capital structure determinants for the sugar sector during 
2000-2005. 
TDR = f (TR, ROA, AT, MBR, S) 
LBDR = f (TR, ROA, AT, MBR, S) 
LMDR = f (TR, ROA, AT, MBR, S) 
 
Explanation of Variables:  
 
 Determinants of capital structure have been identified as tax rate, size, asset 
tangibility, volatility and profitability. Business risk has been identified as a capital 
structure determinant by Booth 2001 but due to unavailability of data we have been 
unable to incorporate it in our analysis. Variables used in this analysis are discussed 
below.    
 
Tax rate: For individual firms, defining tax is difficult. Thus we calculated the average 
tax rate from data on both earnings before and earnings after tax. 
 
Profitability: The ratio of earnings before tax to total assets is used to calculate 
profitability. Past profitability of the firm is an important determinant of its capital 
structure.  
 
Size: Natural logarithm of sales is used as indicator of size. Size is expected to be 
associated with  cost of financial distress. Small firms tend to be liquidated more easily. 
 
Asset tangibility: The ratio of fixed to total assets is used to estimate assets tangibility. 
The rationale underlying this factor is that tangible assets are easy to collateralize and 
thus they reduce the agency costs of debt.  
 
Market-to-book ratio: The market value of equity divided by the book value of the equity. 
Firms with high market-to-book ratios have higher cost of financial distress. 
 
Total-debt ratio: Total liabilities divided by total liabilities plus net worth is equal to 
total-debt ratio. It is used to estimate the debt-equity choice of the company. 
 
Long-term book-debt ratio: Total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by Total 
liabilities minus current liabilities plus net worth is long-term book-debt ratio. 
 
Long-term market-debt ratio: Total liabilities minus current liabilities divided by Total 
liabilities minus current liabilities plus net worth at market value is long-term market-
debt ratio. Through this long term debt financing has been focused, based on the market 
position of the firm. 
 
 All equations are estimated for the sugar sector by fixed and random effects 
pooled regression models. The presence of cross-section and period specific effects may 
be handled using fixed or random effects methods. We can specify models containing 
effects in one or both dimensions, for example, a fixed effect in the cross-section 
dimension and a random effect in the period dimension, or a fixed effect in the cross-
section and a random effect in the period dimension. 
 
 The fixed effects portions of specifications are handled using orthogonal 
projections. In the simple one-way fixed effect specifications and the balanced two-
way fixed specification, these projections involve the familiar approach of removing 
cross-section or period specific means from the dependent variable and exogenous 
variables. 
 
 The random effects specifications assume that the corresponding effects are 
realizations of independent random variables with mean zero and finite variance. Most 
importantly, the random effects specification assumes that the effect is uncorrelated with 
the distinguishing residuals. 
 
 Companies in our sample follow different financial accounting practices. Because 
of these accounting differences, it is not always easy to compare financial statements 
across companies. These accounting differences could have had an impact on our results, 
especially on the book-debt ratios. 
 
 We (like Booth et al 2001) choose variables to explain capital structure 
differences on the basis of Pecking Order Hypothesis (POH), which says that financial 
market imperfections are a core hurdle in explaining capital structure. If external 
financing is necessary the same argument implies that firms should issue debt before 
considering external equity informational asymmetries. This provides a justification for a 
financing hierarchies approach. 
 
 Table 2 provides the averages of the three debt ratios for the companies included 
in the study. The total debt ratio varies from a low of 30.3% in Brazil and 73.4% in Korea 
according to Booth’s (2001) investigation. The average total debt ratio for Pakistan sugar 
mills during 2000 – 2005 is 56.7 percent ranging between 22 percent (for NWFP) to 70 
percent (for Punjab) with in the sample it ranges between 8.1% (Premier Sugar) and 
86.1% (Mirpurkhas Sugar). This large inter provincial variability is mainly due to the age 
of the companies as we observe that on average the higher the age, the lower the total 
debt ratio. 
 
Table 2: 
Average Debt Ratios 2001-2005 
 
Year of Province          Sugar mills                            total debt   long-term  long-term  
listing                                                                                ratio        book dept  market    
                                                                                                           ratio       dept ratio  
1992 S Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Limited      51.9      18.1            12.2  
1979 S Al - Noor Sugar Mills Limited      73.7     49.5            45.5  
1987 S Dewan Sugar Mills Limited      83.6     56.3            51.3  
1984 S Faran Sugar Mills Limited     84.4     67.4            76.3  
1963 S Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. **      48.5     17.3            13.6  
1982 S Habib Arkady Limited **      26.5       0.8               0.6  
1968 S Mehran Sugar Mills Limited      76.3     56.4            48.3  
1984 S Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited      86.1     91.7            24.2  
1989 S Sanghar Sugar Mills Limited     77.3     61.8            74.7  
1984 S Shahmurad Sugar Mills Limited      81.1     55.5            64.1  
1987 S Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Limi      84.3     57.1            69.7  
  Average (Sindh)      70.3     48.3            43.7  
1967 P Adam Sugar      70.1     40.9            39.3  
1965 P Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill      55.7     14.4            10.5  
1994 P Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Limit      46.4     17.0            19.1  
1967 P Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller      43.0       3.1              1.9  
1973 P Kohinoor Sugar Mills Limited      47.4     23.7            20.9  
1966 P Noon Sugar Mills Limited      17.9       2.0               1.2  
1967 P Shahtaj Sugar Mills Limited      46.7     17.8             12.2  
1970 P Shakerganj Sugar Mills Limited      73.3     47.6             37.5  
1992 P Tandianwala Sugar Mills Limite      57.1     24.2             21.0  
1967 P Thal Industrial Corporation Li      83.5     46.6             8.7  
  Average (Punjab)      54.1     23.7            17.2  
1991 N Chashma Sugar Mills Limited      48.7     16.2            11.9  
1961 N Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill      11.7       6.6               3.9  
1955 N Premier Sugar        8.1       0.0               0.0  
  Average (NWFP)      22.8       7.6               5.3  
  overall avearage (Pakistan)      56.7      33.2            28.1  
 
 The difference between total debt ratios and long-term debt ratios were much 
more pronounced in Booth’s study between developing and developed countries. We note 
a similar tendency on an inter-provincial basis. The highest debt ratios are thus in the 
most developed provinces of Pakistan and the lowest in least developed provinces 
However average long-term debt ratio is 48.3% for Sindh; 23.7% for Punjab and only 
7.6% for NWFP, the average long-term debt ratios are 43.7% for Sindh; 17.2% for 
Punjab and 5.3% for NWFP. 
 
 Table 3 shows that on average tax rate has been nearly 16%. The extreme values 
have been omitted in calculation of averages. The real difference due to location is 
negligible. 
 
 
Table 3: 
TAX RATES 
 
                                             2001    2002   2003   2004 2005         
average  
s      Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Ltd.           31.41    105.74     18.89   -10.47   
10.02  31.12 
s      Al - Noor Sugar Mills Ltd.           -35.87        4.10     49.41   -123.14   -8.77       
-22.86  
s     Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd.              9313.24      -5.74     -78.50 -108.76 81.36      
1840.32 
s     Faran Sugar Mills Ltd.                    25.58      -2.28     63.77      0.90  16.06  20.81  
s     Habib Sugar Mills Ltd.                   26.33    124.88     24.41    19.57  21.70  43.38  
s     Habib Arkady Limited                   14.28      17.49   -10.98      8.52  23.05  10.47  
s     Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd.                20.78      -4.32 -330.31    59.14
 260.04   1.07  
s      Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd.         16.16      10.43      8.30    -0.03   -2.02    6.57  
s     Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd.              369.30        0.63    33.74    77.72   -
177.02   60.87  
s      Shahmurad Sugar Mills Ltd.        -87.08      -2.87    -6.78 4171.90  10.14       
817.06  
s     Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Ltd      11.15     38.16    -2.99    35.12   -4.33  15.42   
Average (Sind)                     12.72     42.65    21.54     -9.93    7.96  14.99  
 p            Adam Sugar                           -5.41    18.24    73.10       7.71    7.58  20.24  
p     Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill       59.05     42.91   -35.26     34.31   
15.27  23.26  
p     Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd     -4.50       9.81  282.24   -29.50   
47.75  61.16  
p     Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller        -2.78     -0.02    37.25    30.13   
34.93  19.90  
p     Kohinoor Sugar Mills Ltd             34.53       9.09  -13.43    12.51   
36.21  15.78  
p     Noon Sugar Mills Ltd                   22.26     17.30    19.28      9.11   
14.42  16.47  
p     Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd                49.43      44.01    41.89    36.76   
35.50  41.52  
p     Shakerganj Sugar Mills Ltd          46.43      11.25    17.06    25.97  -
15.41  17.06  
p     Tandianwala Sugar Mills Ltd         -6.45       3.54   -18.20    11.65   
46.83    7.47  
p      Thal Industrial Corporation Ltd     0.44     36.30     -3.32     5.60   
22.84  12.37   
 Average (Punjab)                21.95     20.29     13.15    19.31   22.02 19.34  
n       Chashma Sugar Mills Ltd          -20.65     16.68     -1.65    36.45   
41.72  14.51  
n        Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill       0.74      -8.21     83.68  -92.89  -
19.30  -7.20  
n       Premier Sugar                             -4.77      7.71  -158.41  -33.86      3.33       -
37.20           Average (NWFP)                      -9.96       4.23     41.02  -28.22   
11.21   3.66            Overall average (Pakistan)        14.81     27.20    19.
 
   
   
 Average return on assets a measure of performance is shown in table 4. 
Table 4 
AVERAGE RETURN ON ASSETS 2001-2005 
 
                                          2001      2002 2003 2004       2005      average  
s     Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Limited      8.34    -0.75     5.65   11.71   4.19        5.83  
s     Al - Noor Sugar Mills Limited      -1.18    -7.39   -4.78    0.76   4.56      -1.60  
s     Dewan Sugar Mills Limited           0.02    -8.33   -2.78    1.68   0.87      -1.71  
s     Faran Sugar Mills Limited             5.90  -10.27   -7.94    7.74   4.12      -0.09  
s     Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. **             8.56      0.71     3.91    9.88  10.27      6.67  
s     Habib Arkady Limited **            21.09    22.71     7.30    3.29   5.27     11.93  
s      Mehran Sugar Mills Limited         3.88  -16.25   -0.30    3.19    0.57    -1.78  
s      Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd        -5.60  -25.15   -9.17  -3.14  10.84    -6.44  
s     Sanghar Sugar Mills Limited        -0.28  -17.22  -11.69    2.84   -2.99    -5.87  
s     Shahmurad Sugar Mills Ltd         -0.68  -12.70   -5.88  -0.02   -1.91    -4.24  
s     Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Ltd    -4.86    -8.28   -7.10    2.85 -12.44   -5.97      
  Average (Sind)                              3.20   -7.54   -2.98    3.71    2.12    -0.30 
p    Adam Sugar                                -9.36     8.73     1.10    7.03    2.56      2.01  
p     Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill       2.30   12.07   -1.84  -4.90    5.45      2.62  
p    Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd    -5.83     4.69   -0.83    1.48  10.62      2.03  
p     Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller    -19.32   48.07   10.04  17.08  26.03    16.38  
p    Kohinoor Sugar Mills Ltd             -7.61     6.08   -3.30    3.63    9.22      1.60  
p    Noon Sugar Mills Ltd                    6.25   18.55   13.76  14.66  11.63     12.97  
p     Shahtaj Sugar Mills Limited          3.02   32.38   27.44  19.99 32.54      23.07  
p     Shakerganj Sugar Mills Ltd          1.36     6.87     6.00    3.39   1.78       3.88  
p    Tandianwala Sugar Mills Ltd        -8.57   24.53   -2.24    2.96   3.25       3.99  
p    Thal Industrial Corporation Ltd  -21.10     2.74 -12.42  11.89 20.37       0.30   
Average (Punjab)               -5.89   16.47     3.77    7.72      12.34       6.88  
n      Chashma Sugar Mills Limited     -6.50   19.77   -4.20    3.33   9.56       4.39  
n       Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill     -7.86   -3.10     1.17    2.34   9.18       0.35  
n     Premier Sugar                             -0.85   -1.00   -0.87   -1.59 12.05      1.55         
Average (NWFP)                       -5.07     5.22   -1.30    1.36 10.27      2.10         
Overall average (Pakistan)          -1.62     4.06    0.04    5.09   7.40       2.99 
 
 
 It will be observed that the average for Sindh is negative. It is 6.88% for Punjab 
and 2.1% for NWFP. These figures do not show the real picture because of a possibility 
of manipulation of financial data and use of unethical and corrupt practices. 
 In 2006 an additional profit of nearly Rs.60bn was earned on stocks of sugar in 
hand by the industry, when prices of sugar shot up from Rs.25/kg to Rs.40/kg. The 
industry is mainly owned by those who matter in the ruling power hierarchy. Only 6 –
corporations paid dividend every year during 2000 – 2005. 13- corporations did not pay 
any dividend during the period under study. Seven corporations paid dividend only in one 
year during this period. The market stock price of only six firms on average exceeded the 
par- value during 2000 – 2005.  
 Table 5 presents the averages of the assets tangibility ratio. Size is shown in Table 
6. Both tables suggest that there is a dissimilarity amongst the provinces. The assets 
tangibility and size ratios are lower for older firms and are higher for younger firms 
mainly because of inflation effect. 
 
Table 5: 
AVERAGE  ASSETS TANGIBILITY RATIO 
 
                                            2001     2002  2003  2004         2005       average  
s    Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Limited      52.65     53.24        58.81  51.76       52.94    
53.88  
s    Al - Noor Sugar Mills Limited       53.79     52.42        71.16  71.04       68.32    
63.34  
s    Dewan Sugar Mills Limited            35.07     33.20       45.70  59.95       
49.17    44.62 
s    Faran Sugar Mills Limited              71.97     41.88    69.36  65.74       
60.14    61.82 
s    Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. **             44.37     41.96        46.25  50.39       53.55    
47.30  
s    Habib Arkady Limited **              41.11     43.98        58.90  50.91       53.07    
49.59  
s    Mehran Sugar Mills Limited          61.19     68.39        61.79  53.93       61.45    
61.35  
s    Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited    43.73     54.99        67.32  60.81       61.29    
57.63  
s    Sanghar Sugar Mills Limited           83.01    87.55        87.31  81.93       83.81    
84.72  
s    Shahmurad Sugar Mills Limited     43.32     45.48        55.06  67.85       61.34     
54.61  
s    Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Ltd      43.24     43.40        37.61  48.69       56.84     
45.96      Average (Sind)                               52.13     51.50       59.93  60.27       
60.17     56.80  
p   Adam Sugar                                   44.63     39.40       54.04  47.30       61.33    
49.34  
p   Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill        56.20     61.40        61.42  40.53       44.01     
52.71  
p   Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd      65.90     63.59       61.18  67.43       82.18     
68.05  
p   Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller        37.95     55.04        36.79  44.74       53.54     
45.61  
p    Kohinoor Sugar Mills Limited       58.16     77.67        73.91  74.64       75.29    
71.93  
p   Noon Sugar Mills Limited               53.57    64.13       60.05  57.22       65.45    
60.08  
p   Shahtaj Sugar Mills Limited            52.87    51.57        47.28  51.86       50.15     
50.75  
p   Shakerganj Sugar Mills Ltd             63.48    58.52       40.16  48.78       49.18     
52.02  
p   Tandianwala Sugar Mills Ltd         100.00     83.91      64.73  57.88       69.33     
75.17  
p   Thal Industrial Corporation Ltd    100.00     79.27       73.15  70.57       68.73     
78.34  
      Average (Punjab)                          63.28     63.45      57.27        56.09     61.92     60.40  
n    Chashma Sugar Mills Limited       52.39     61.81      37.89       70.67       72.58     
59.07  
n     Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill      25.95     25.74      23.17        23.93      20.26      
23.81  
n    Premier Sugar                               45.69     53.39     51.17        54.05      48.61     50.58      Average (N
Table 6: 
AVERAGE S1ZE 
 
                                          2001   2002  2003 2004         2005    average  
s     Al - Abbas Sugar Mills Ltd            7.48     7.15     7.09     7.18        7.45       7.27  
s     Al - Noor Sugar Mills Ltd              7.20     6.96     7.16     7.33        7.44       7.22  
s     Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd                  7.47     6.68     7.34     6.61        7.81       7.18  
s    Faran Sugar Mills Ltd                      7.41     6.34     7.24     6.90        7.06       6.99  
s    Habib Sugar Mills Ltd. **               7.72     7.34     7.33     7.72        7.94       7.61  
s    Habib Arkady Limited **               6.26     6.31     5.83     6.02        5.82       6.05  
s    Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd                  6.99     6.53     6.64     6.50        7.01       6.73  
s    Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd            6.22     6.25     6.45     6.21        6.65       6.35  
s    Sanghar Sugar Mills Ltd                 6.82     5.85     6.37     6.52        6.34       6.38  
s    Shahmurad Sugar Mills Ltd            7.16     6.69     6.90     6.72        6.97       6.89  
s    Sind Abadgars Sugar Mills Ltd       6.60     6.26     6.40     6.67        6.25       6.44      
Average (Sind)                                       7.03     6.58     6.80     6.76        6.98       6.83  
p   Adam Sugar                                      6.24     6.82     6.55     6.37        5.85       6.37  
p    Crescent Sugar Mills & Distill         7.22     7.28     7.08     7.48        7.64       7.34  
p   Haseeb Waqas Sugar Mills Ltd        6.83     7.38     7.23     7.41        7.22       7.21  
p   Husein Sugar Mills & Distiller          6.35     7.09     6.56     6.97        7.05       6.80  
p   Kohinoor Sugar Mills Limited          6.36     6.81     6.66     6.70        6.75       6.66  
p   Noon Sugar Mills Limited                6.51     6.94     6.85     6.99        6.98       6.86  
p    Shahtaj Sugar Mills Limited            7.13     7.43     7.38     7.36        7.42       7.34  
p    Shakerganj Sugar Mills Ltd            7.69     7.87     7.66     8.16        8.51       7.98  
p     Tandianwala Sugar Mills Ltd         7.04     7.23     6.74     6.96        7.68       7.13  
p    Thal Industrial Corporation Ltd     6.05     6.57     6.63     7.14        7.23       6.72        
Average (Punjab)                             6.74     7.14     6.93     7.15        7.23       7.04  
n     Chashma Sugar Mills Ltd               6.57     7.16     6.36     7.28        7.13       6.90  
n      Frontier Sugar Mills & Distill         4.51    4.85     5.08     5.92        5.18       5.11  
n     Premier Sugar                                5.23      6.11    5.92     6.69        6.67       6.13        
Average (NWFP)                             5.44     6.04     5.79     6.63        6.33       6.04          
Overall average (Pakistan)                 6.71     6.75     6.73     6.91        7.00       6.82 
 
 
 
 Appendix - 1 shows averages of investigations of various variables for 
theoretically bankrupt corporations. It is observed that the same group owns most of 
them. These groups are highly influential in political bureaucratic and power circles. This 
is evidenced from the names of directors of these corporations presented in appendix 2. 
 
 Booth et el (2001 table II) had also presented information on macroeconomic 
variables. Chart 1 shows that stock market value per GDP and real GDP growth are 
highly scattered and not explaining each other sufficiently as the coefficient of correlation 
is only 0.24 with a negative sign. Data on other macro financial variable for the period 
1981 – 2005 are provided in table 7. we will present a full analysis of the impact of these 
on capital structure of the sugar sector in a subsequent paper. 
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Table 7 
Macro Financial Data  
 
                                 Stock market          Liquid                Real GDP    Cumulative   
                                     value / GDP     liabilities / GDP    growth rate     inflation  
                     1981 2.4      9.3           6.40            21.17 
                    1982 2.9      8.7           7.60            23.68 
                     1983 3.7      8.5           6.80            25.08 
                    1984 4.7      8.3           4.00            26.68 
                    1985 4.6      8.5             8.7            28.30 
                    1986 4.7      8.5             6.4            29.89 
                    1987 5.5      8.1             5.8            30.94 
                    1988 5.6      8.1             6.4            32.39 
                    1989           5.7           8.5         4.8    35.25  
                   1990 5.7      9.5             4.6  38.01  
                   1991 6.7     10.1             5.6  41.46  
                   1992 18.0      9.8             7.7  46.34  
                   1993 16.0     11.1             2.3  50.75  
                   1994 25.7     11.2             4.5  55.81  
                   1995 15.6     11.0             4.1  62.71  
                   1996 17.4     12.8             6.6  70.46  
                   1997 19.3     14.0             1.7  77.76  
                   1998 9.7     15.3              3.5  86.61  
                   1999 9.7     13.3             4.2  92.00  
                   2000 10.3 11.4 3.9 95.82  
                   2001 8.1 12.0 1.8              100.00  
                  2002 9.3 10.3 3.1              103.15  
                  2003 15.5 10.1 4.8              106.54  
                  2004 24.1 10.6 6.4              109.65  
 
IV.  RESULTS  
 
 We begin by identifying the theoretically expected signs of the coefficients of the 
independent variables. Theoretically, the higher the difference between ROA and cost of 
capital the higher is the return on equity because of the leverage effects. Similarly the 
higher turnover of assets results in higher return on assets, which in turn results in higher 
return on equity. Thus the assets tangibility ratio i.e., ratio between fixed assets and total 
assets becomes important as capital structure determinant. 
 
 The real value of an asset is what the market is willing to pay. Thus, the market 
value of stock affects the chances of raising funds through debt and equity. The higher 
the market value of the stock of a company the greater its chances to raise debt equity. 
The Tax Rate effects the real cost of capital as interest being an expense qualifies for tax 
exemption. Therefore as the cost of debt decreases the use of debt results in higher return 
on equity.  
Regression analysis results are shown in Tables 8 through 13 using both fixed and 
random effects.  
 
Table 8: 
Dependent Variable: TDR    Method: Pooled 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120    
Variable                      Coefficient           Std. Error            t-Statistic Prob.    
 C                                     0.343479              0.226806           1.514416      0.1327  
TR                                    0.000149              0.001988           0.074783      0.9405  
ROA                                 -1.09572              0.181355            -6.04187               0  
AT                                    -0.55074                0.12704            -4.33514               0  
MBR                         -0.03528                             0.004449         -7.931               0  
S                               10.25452                             3.220949     3.183695      0.0019  
 
 
R-squared                  0.557999            Mean dependent var   0.574992 
Adjusted R-squared   0.538613            S.D. dependent var    0.292466  
S.E. of regression       0.198659            Sum squared resid   4.499064  
Log likelihood            26.74471             F-statistic   28.78362  Durbin-Watson 
 
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 From table 8 it is found that ROA, AT, MB and S are found to be significant 
determinants of TDR. TR was found to be insignificant. However only S and TR was 
found to have a correct theoretical sign. This was also the case in Booth’s study. 
Coefficient of determination is relatively weak in this case as it was for Booth’s sample. 
F-statistic results indicates dissimilarity in means of selected variables. The negative sign 
with respect to AT may be explained on the basis of artificially floated asset values. It is 
however very surprising that high MBR and ROA rations have negative signs. Profitable 
sugar firms in Pakistan display a preference for equity financing. The politically powerful 
seths declare no profits and borrow as much as they can. 
 
Table 9: 
 
Dependent Variable: TDR   
 Method: Pooled Least Squares / Fixed 
Effects   
 Sample(adjusted): 1 24  
 Included observations: 24 after adjusting 
endpoints   
Number of cross-sections used: 5   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120    
 
     Variable                 Coefficient                  Std. Error          t-Statistic          Prob.    
TR   0.00075 0.001999              0.375201      0.7082  
ROA -1.18883   0.18513                -6.4216       0  
AT -0.56779 0.126866                -4.4755       0  
MB -0.03654 0.004487              -8.14172       0  
S 9.455093 3.230934              2.926427       0.0042  
 
Fixed Effects          
_01—C 0.331405      
 _02—C 0.415797        
_03—C 0.408815        
_04—C 0.445489        
_05—C 0.468651       
 
 
R-squared  0.580791     Mean dependent var       0.574992  
Adjusted R-squared 0.546492     S.D. dependent var       0.292466  
S.E. of regression 0.196956     Sum squared resid       4.267071  
Log likelihood 29.92123     F-statistic      38.09973  
Durbin-Watson stat   1.55215     Prob(F-statistic)                   0  
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 Under the fixed effect case table 9 shows that only TR was found to be an 
insignificant determinants of TDR. Here too only TR and S are found to be with a correct 
theoretical sign. Coefficient of determination is again weak (like Booth 2001) in this 
case. Means of selected variables are different. Results of random and fixed effects (like 
Booth et el 2001) estimations confirm each other, which is encouraging. 
 
Table 10: 
Dependent Variable: LBDR     
Method: Pooled Least Squares / Random Effects    
Sample(adjusted): 1 24     
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints    
Number of cross-sections used: 5     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120    
 
             Variable              Coefficient                   Std. Error         t-Statistic       Prob.    
C 0.541213 0.482283             1.122191    0.2641  
TR -0.00143 0.004227             -0.33878    0.7354  
ROA -1.79702 0.385635             -4.65989    0  
AT -0.48371   0.27014             -1.79059      0.076  
MB -0.03072   0.00946             -3.24713    0.0015  
S 4.145769 6.849053             0.605306    0.5462      
R-squared 0.269248     Mean dependent var       0.38705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.237198     S.D. dependent var         0.48367  
S.E. of regression 0.422431     Sum squared resid     20.34303  
Log likelihood -63.7874     F-statistic     8.400747  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.990766     Prob(F-statistic)      0.000001      
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 From table 10 it is found that ROA, AT, and MBR are significant determinants of 
LBDR. The rest of the independent variables were found to be insignificant. Only S is 
found to have a correct theoretical sign. Coefficient of determination is very weak in this 
case. F-stats results indicates dissimilarity in means of selected variables. Once again the 
message is that profitable firms with good market performance prefer equity financing. 
The politically powerful large sugar firms declare no profits and borrow as much as they 
can. 
 
 
Table 11: 
Dependent Variable: LBDR     
Method: Pooled Least Squares / Fixed Effects    
Sample(adjusted): 1 24    
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints   
Number of cross-sections used: 5     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120    
              
Variable                    Coefficient Std. Error            t-Statistic          Prob.    
TR  -0.00117     0.004329               -0.2698      0.7878  
ROA -1.91792     0.400951             -4.78343               0  
AT -0.51633    0.274763              -1.87917      0.0629  
MB -0.03234    0.009719              -3.32758      0.0012  
S 3.255819            6.997504              0.465283      0.6426  
Fixed Effects          
_01—C 0.575767        
_02—C 0.647892        
_03—C 0.556001        
_04—C 0.663106        
_05—C 0.704042        
        
R-squared 0.281024     Mean dependent var      0.38705  
Adjusted R-squared 0.222199     S.D. dependent var      0.48367  
S.E. of regression 0.426563     Sum squared resid          20.0152  
Log likelihood -62.8126     F-statistic                     10.74886   
Durbin-Watson stat 2.022659     Prob(F-statistic)                        0  
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 From table 11 it is found that AT and S are insignificant determinants of LBDR 
under fixed effect regression. The rest of the independent variables were found to be 
significant. Again S is the only variable found to have a correct theoretical sign to explain 
LBDR. Coefficient of determination is very weak in this case. F-stats results indicates 
dissimilarity in means of selected variables.  Random and fixed effect estimations 
confirm each other and provide evidence for the relative robustness of our results. 
 
Table 12: 
Dependent Variable: LMDR     
Method: Pooled Least Squares / Random Effects    
Sample(adjusted): 1 24     
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints    
Number of cross-sections used: 5     
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120    
 
 
        Variable                      Coefficient             Std. Error            t-Statistic          Prob.  
  
C 0.553787 0.482174              1.148521       0.2532  
TR -0.00083 0.004226              -0.19647       0.8446  
ROA -1.30362 0.385548              -3.38122         0.001  
AT -0.29257 0.270079              -1.08328         0.281  
MB   -0.0302 0.009458              -3.19366       0.0018  
S 1.467163 6.847511              0.214262       0.8307      
R-squared  0.201191 Mean dependent var         0.343625  
Adjusted R-squared 0.166155 S.D. dependent var         0.462503  
S.E. of regression 0.422336     Sum squared resid         20.33387  
Log likelihood -63.7604     F-statistic         5.742476 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.951705     Prob(F-statistic)         0.000092   
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 From table 12 it is found that only ROA and MB are significant determinants of 
LMDR. The rest of the independent variables were found to be insignificant. In this case 
S is found to be with a correct theoretical sign. Coefficient of determination is very weak 
in this case. F-stats results indicates dissimilarity in means of selected variables. The 
association between MBR and LMDR is obvious. But the negative relationship between 
LMDR on the one hand and ROA and MBR indicates once again political compulsions 
lenders are not primarily concerned with the profitability or the market performance of 
the borrower firm. 
 
Table 13: 
Dependent Variable: LMDR      
Method: Pooled Least Squares / Fixed Effects     
Sample(adjusted): 1 24      
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints    
Number of cross-sections used: 5      
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120     
 
                 Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
        TR -0.00075 0.004337 -0.17325 0.8628  
       ROA -1.32329 0.40171 -3.29415 0.0013  
       AT -0.31582 0.275283 -1.14726 0.2538  
       MB -0.03191 0.009737 -3.27689 0.0014  
      S 0.36061 7.010748 0.051437 0.9591  
 
              Fixed Effects   
                _01—C 0.622537  
                _02—C 0.57279  
                _03—C 0.662041  
                _04—C 0.690519  
                _05—C  0.696205  
 
 
 
  R-squared   0.21073     Mean dependent var     0.343625  
  Adjusted R-squared 0.146154     S.D. dependent var     0.462503  
  S.E. of regression 0.427371     Sum squared resid     20.09104  
  Log likelihood -63.0396     F-statistic     7.342334  
  Durbin-Watson stat 1.971651     Prob(F-statistic)     0.000028  
 
At 5% rejection region, t-values with * mark means they are significant. 
 
 From table 13 it is found that ROA and MB are significant determinants of 
LMDR. The rest of the independent variables were found to be insignificant. In this case 
too S is found to be with a correct theoretical sign. Coefficient of determination is very 
weak in this case. F-stats results indicates dissimilarity in means of selected variables. 
Once again there is close correspondence between the random and fixed effects 
estimations. 
 
      Table: 14 Summary of the Findings 
 
                               Dependent Variable Significant Variables   R2  
                       TDR  ROA, AT, MB and S Weak  
                        TDR (Fixed effect) ROA, AT, MB and S Weak  
                       LBDR  ROA and MB Weak  
                        LBDR (Fixed effect) ROA and MB Weak  
                       LMDR  ROA and MB Weak  
                        LMDR (Fixed effect) ROA and MB Weak  
 
 In this study we assessed whether capial structure theory explains borrowing by 
sugar sector of Pakistan. Our case suggests that decision on capital structuring is found to 
be weakly affected by the variables chosen in our study. This is also weakly consistent 
with the results of Booth et el (2001) where modern finance theory is found to be weakly 
portable across the group of developing and developed countires. It is interesting to find 
that Booth et el (2001) also found a negative association between most independent 
variables on the one hand and TDR, LBDR and LMDR on the other. (Table 15) provides 
a comparison of the results of Booth with our findings for the case of Pakistan. 
 
Table 15 provides the comparison of the results of Booth with our findings for the case of 
Pakistan.  
 
 
Table 15 provides the comparison of the results of Booth with our findings for the case of 
Pakistan. 
TABLE 15   
Dependant Variable: TDR               Expected Signs Booth / Kanwar            Actual signs  
                                                                                                                   Booth’s  
Kanwar’s  
                                                                TA                    +                         -                    + 
                                                               ROA                  +                         -                     - 
                                                               AT                     +                         -                     - 
                                                               MBR                  +                        -                     -  
                                                                 S                      +                        +                     + 
 
 
 
 
Dependant Variable: LBDR               Expected Signs Booth / Kanwar            Actual signs 
                                                                                                                       Booth’s  
Kanwar’s               
 
                                                                TA                    +                         -                     - 
                                                               ROA                  +                         -                     - 
                                                               AT                     +                         +                    - 
                                                               MBR                  +                        -                     -  
                                                                 S                      +                        +                     + 
 
Dependant Variable: LMDR               Expected Signs Booth / Kanwar            Actual signs 
                                                                                                                         Booth’s 
Kanwar’s   
              
   
                                                                TA                    +                         -                     - 
                                                               ROA                  +                         -                     - 
                                                               AT                     +                         +                     - 
                                                               MBR                  +                        -                     -  
                                                                 S                      +                        +                     + 
 
The only major difference between Booth’s results and ours’ is that Booth found a 
positive association between AT and LBDR and LMDR. This as we have explained by 
the artificial blowing up of fixed values by sugar seths in Pakistan to increase borrowing. 
  
 Booth’s results indicated that there is a separate story to tell about the 
determinants of capital structure for each country. Our investigation and results indicate 
that for Pakistan’s sugsare industry the real determinats of corporate capital structure are 
not the variables discussed in the finance literature but the influence in the power 
hierarchy and the extent to which those who matter can be corrupted. 
 
 As the appendix 1 shows several major corporations have negative net equity for 
a number of years and they are still being quoted on the stock exchange. No creditor 
including banks dare sue them for bankruptcy. SECP fails to take actions although results 
are filed with it periodically. 
 
 A consistent result in both Booth and our investigations is that the more profitable 
the firm, the lower the debt ratio. This finding is consistent with the Pecking order 
Hypothesis.  
We agree with booth that much needs to be done in empirical research and in developing 
the theoretical model.      
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APPENDIX –1  
Theoretically Bankrupt Mills. 
Tables 1 
 
year of Prov     total debt ratio                2001       2002     2003     2004     2005   
average listing    ince 
1990        S       Al - Asif Sugar Mills Ltd    181.06   215.46  239.80  251.98  183.13   
214.29 
1991       S        Ansari Sugar Mills Ltd        83.19      93.19    98.74    99.98   103.89   
95.80 
1965      S        Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd      23.96    194.73   236.90 254.53  255.89   
193.20 
1993      S        Khairpur Sugar                  148.65    159.81  140.15    87.99   93.45    
126.01 
1994      S         Mirza Sugar Mills Ltd      166.46    195.74   226.60  259.41  267.14   
223.07 
1987      S         Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd    168.35   218.13   244.87  278.37  274.69   
236.88 
1990      S         Sakrand Sugar Mills Ltd     95.29    104.86   114.02 122.58  126.14    
112.58          
              P       Baba Farid Sugar Mills Ld   96.22      94.35     93.87  103.05  101.10     
97.72                    P          United Sugar Mills Ltd     
234.56   213.92  190.32  196.64   174.25   201.94      
    Average                      133.08   165.58 176.14  183.84  175.52    
166.83  
 
 
Table 2 
 
  long-term book-debt ratio 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited 317.26  -73.57 -17.13 816.31  222.61   
253.10  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited  76.14   88.98 97.83 99.96 108.67     
94.32  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited    9.91   -7.66 -5.09 -46.66   -560.42  -
121.98  
s Khairpur Sugar 460.16 -16458.22 174.52  82.48   88.52  -
3130.51  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 197.15 294.19 497.45 -751.89  -313.88  -
15.39  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited -35.98 -15.30 -9.81   -6.28  -321.85 - 
77.84  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited  94.49 107.53 122.71  140.06    157.10  
124.38  
 
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited 91.18 82.45 85.97 112.07 102.87
 94.91  
p United Sugar Mills Limited -2014.96 1745.90 4452.77 -493.60 -47.49
 728.52  
  Average -89.41 -1581.74 599.91 -5.28 -62.65 -
227.83  
 
 
 
Table 3 
 
  long-term market-debt ratio 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited 824.42 -53.35 -14.35 5707.81  265.48
 1346.00  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited   80.28 114.80    151.94 121.09  146.29
 122.88  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited   10.38   -6.92  -4.64 -43.97 -519.89 -
113.01  
s Khairpur Sugar                           -101.64 -4537.85   240.63   91.46  102.27 -
841.02  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 302.37 610.87  2545.17  -372.68 -203.84
 576.38  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited -23.07 -11.63  -8.25 -5.54   -221.01 -
53.90  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 120.29 153.53 174.31 189.45  239.17
 175.35  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited 119.51 162.41    148.36   94.71 98.34
 124.67  
p United Sugar Mills Limited         -481.78   1778.85  3141.52  -619.91
 60.89 775.92  
  Average  94.53 198.81    708.30 573.60 -3.59
 234.81  
 
Table 4 
 
  tax rate 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited -4.89 -0.77 -5.15    2.54  -3.21    -
2.30  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited 18.45 -2.68 -7.99  -4.82   211.64    
42.92  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited -1.57 -0.96 10.67  78.86    0.20    
17.44  
s Khairpur Sugar 0.00 0.00   1.34  -3.12 -5.47    -
1.45  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 89.80 -1.64   0.27  -1.35 -0.88    
17.24  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited 371.47 -2.35 -3.63  -3.98 -1.27    
72.05  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 57.80 -2.66 -4.94  -6.24   -14.27      
5.94  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited -7.90 12.20    -254.05  -3.59 14.97   -
47.67  
p United Sugar Mills Limited 0.00     -6752.91  65.55 308.86 56.08   -
1264.48  
  Average 58.13    -750.20 -21.99 40.80 28.64     -
128.92  
 
Table 5 
 
  ROA 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited -8.99 -29.27 -7.80  12.46 -1.85    -
7.09  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited 1.94 -9.96 -5.53  -8.13 -3.51    -
5.04  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited -21.29 -40.41    -14.89  -5.77 -8.07   -
18.09  
s Khairpur Sugar -14.74 -10.51 21.21  -8.61   5.25     -
1.48  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 0.78 -22.30    -20.42 -30.73  -24.53   -
19.44  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited 0.31 -27.25    -16.47 -23.78  -19.82   -
17.40  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 0.68 -9.20 -8.28   -7.19 -2.22     -
5.24  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited -7.41 6.14 -0.33   -8.77   1.54     -
1.77  
p United Sugar Mills Limited -4.27 -1.24   7.47    0.08 64.37     
13.28  
  average       -5.89      -16.00 -5.00   -8.94  1.24     -
6.92  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
 Asset tangibility 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited 77.51 77.82 75.66 83.57 72.56
 77.42  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited 80.21 77.23 78.09 72.73 78.29
 77.31  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited 50.90 62.03 64.56 61.37 67.72
 61.32  
s Khairpur Sugar 91.98 90.54 88.59 91.57 87.12
 89.96  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 91.03 90.18 85.88 79.00 63.91
 82.00  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited 85.68 86.26 73.65 70.57 48.79
 72.99  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 89.66 82.45 85.83 87.18 86.67
 86.36  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited 52.88 50.75 58.29 32.89 32.19
 45.40  
p United Sugar Mills Limited 81.05 66.83 65.95 66.84 65.34
 69.20  
  average 77.88 76.01 75.17 71.75 66.96
 73.55 
 
Table 7 
 
  Size 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited 6.21 5.35 6.01 5.63 4.18 5.47  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited 6.75 6.44 6.89 6.80 6.72 6.72  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited 6.36 6.05 6.38 6.33 4.90 6.00  
s Khairpur Sugar 6.04 6.48 6.48 6.27 6.33 6.32  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 6.36 5.81 6.06 5.81 5.29 5.86  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited 6.37 5.85 5.92 6.02 5.30 5.89  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 6.63 6.11 6.61 6.64 6.25 6.45  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited 6.52 7.18 6.61 6.12 6.42 6.57  
p United Sugar Mills Limited -13.82 6.32 6.80 6.79 6.97 2.61  
  average 4.16 6.18 6.42 6.27 5.82 5.77  
 
 
Table 8 
 
  market to book ratio 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 average  
s Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited 12.54 10.16 20.20 45.60  58.90
 29.48  
s Ansari Sugar Mills Limited 82.21 32.88 5.75 62.02  51.78
 46.93  
s Bawany Sugar Mills Limited 62.00 30.50 31.16 67.61  90.52
 56.36  
s Khairpur Sugar                         -187.03 96.40 45.00 58.50  53.00
 13.17  
s Mirza Sugar Mills Limited 15.00 17.00 25.00 45.00  29.50
 26.30  
s Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited 15.00 13.50 29.49 36.50  30.00
 24.90  
s Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited 20.52 13.40 25.41 43.72  42.43
 29.09  
p Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited 52.30 26.26 24.99  132.14 115.60
 70.26  
p United Sugar Mills Limited -210.11 98.61     110.19   137.77  1061.74
 239.64  
  average       -15.29    37.64 35.24 69.87 170.39 59.57  
 
 
 
Appendix - 2 
Board of Directors of Theoretically Bankrupt Mills: 
 
Al - Asif Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1990  
Mr. Qazi Amjad Abid Abbasi  
Mr.  M. Arshad Mirza  
Mr. Ali Akbar Junejo  
Mr. Haji Sher Jamali  
Mr. Shaikh Aftab Ahmed  
Mr. Kemal Shoaib  
Mr.  Muhammad Abdul Samad  
Mrs. Husna Amjad Kazi 
 
Ansari Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1991  
Mr.dinshaw hoshang anklesaria  
Mr.ahmed khan Ansari  
Mr. Abdul hafeez Ansari  
Mrs. Nasreen ghani Ansari  
Mr. Imran rasheed Ansari  
Syed Anwar Raza Naqvi  
Mr. S.M. Ahsan raza(nominee of N.I.T)  
Mr. M. manzurul haq (nominee of N.D.F.C) 
 
Bawany Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1965  
Mr. M. Arshad Mirza  
Mr. Qazi amjad abid abbasi  
Mrs. Husna amjad kazi  
Mr. Muhammad din  
Mr.Muhammad ashiq  
Mr. Sadiq awan  
Mr.azeem awan  
Mr. Syed zamir hassan  
Mr. Ansar hussain  
 
 
Khairpur Sugar(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1993  
Mr. Muhammad mubeen jumani  
Mr. Faisal mubeen jumani  
Mr. Muhammad bux  
Mrs. Qamar  
Mr.ahmed ali  
Mrs. Yameen  
Mr. Syed raza abbas jafri(nominee of N.I.T) 
 
Mirza Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1994  
Dr. (Mrs.) fehmida Mirza  
Mir. Ghulamullah talpur   
Mr.arshad abid abbasi  
Ms. Fareha abid kazi  
Mir. Furqan ali talpur  
Mirza saulat raza  
Mr. Ali jawad jabir Ansari 
 
Pangrio Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1987  
Mr.aftab ahmad  
begum akhtar abid  
Ms. Naheed zafar Mirza  
Mr. Abbas ally agha  
Mr.mazhar ali Ansari  
Mr. Abdullah kamran soomro  
Mr.atif saeed  
Mr. Akber ali Mirza  
Mr. Muhammad asif (nominee of N.I.T) 
 
Sakrand Sugar Mills Limited(SINDH)  
YEAR OF LISTING:1990  
Mr. S. Baqar Naqvi  
Dr. jamshed hoshang anklesaria  
Mr.waseem kerio  
Mr.hamida bano  
Miss zahida kerio  
Miss shahida kerio 
 
Mr. Raza ahmed longi(nominee of I.C.P)  
Mr. Syed lutf ali shah(nominee of N.D.F.C) 
 
Baba Farid Sugar Mills Limited(PUNJAB)  
Mr. Ghulam muhammad A. Fecto  
Mr. Muhammad ali fecto  
Mr. Kaiser mahmood fecto  
Mr. Yahya ahmed bawamy  
Mr. Moin A. haroon  
Mr.james r. Richards  
Mr.fazlur rehman  
 
United Sugar Mills Limited(PUNJAB),  
Mr. Syed ahmed mahmud,  
Mrs. Amina tareen 
Mr.jahangir tareen,  
Mrs. Sameera mahmud   
Mr. Ijaz ahmed phulpoto,  
Mr.muhammad nawaz  
 
Source: Company Financial Statements. 
